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The Impact of the Size, Scope, and 
Scale of the Milošević Trial and the 
Development of Rule 73bis before the 
ICTY 
Gillian Higgins∗ 
“Today, as never before, we see international justice in action.” 
Carla Del Ponte, February 12, 2002 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The death of Slobodan Milošević in his cell on March 11, 
2006 at the United Nations Detention Unit in The Hague brought 
an end to a trial that had lasted more than four years. The news of 
his death was shocking, and yet not wholly unexpected. It 
prompted instant worldwide analysis of his trial before the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and the question of whether or not things should have been done 
differently. He was charged with sixty-six counts in three 
indictments (Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia) including war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide. It was alleged that he was 
individually criminally responsible for having planned, instigated, 
ordered, aided and abetted and/or committed the crimes pursuant to 
a joint criminal enterprise (JCE).1 He was also charged pursuant to 
                                                 
∗ Barrister; LLM; former assigned counsel to Slobodan Milošević; founding 
member of the International Criminal Law Bureau 
(www.internationalcriminallawbureau.com). The author would like to thank 
Cindy Nesbit. 
1 The Statute of ICTY does not explicitly codify the concept of joint criminal 
enterprise (JCE). Rather the Appeals Chamber in Tadić introduced JCE in its 
Judgment in July 1999 and elaborated on the concept. The Appeals Chamber in 
Tadić determined that there are three types of JCE. All three forms share the 
following actus reus elements: (i) a plurality of persons; (ii) the existence of a 
common plan, design or purpose which need not be previously arranged or 
formulated and which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime under 
the Statute; and (iii) the participation of the accused in the common design 
involving the perpetration of one of the crimes provided for in the Statute. The 
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the doctrine of superior responsibility. The size and scope of the 
sixty-six count indictment spanning a ten year period of war has 
raised legitimate questions about the propriety and fairness of such 
mega-trials.  
¶2 This article examines the impact of the scale of the Milošević 
indictment and the subsequent positive development and 
application of increased judicial powers under Rule 73bis at the 
ICTY to control the presentation of the prosecution’s case in chief. 
Rule 73bis was introduced into the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of the ICTY in July 1998, after the trial of the first 
defendant, Duško Tadić.2 The aim of the Rule is to expedite and 
improve the management of pre-trial and trial proceedings.3 Under 
Rule 73bis, at the pre-trial conference, the trial chamber has the 
power to call upon the prosecution to shorten the estimated length 
of the examination-in-chief of witnesses, and determine the 
number of witnesses the prosecution may call as well as the time 
available for the presentation of evidence.4 In July 2003, the scope 
                                                                                                             
mens rea element distinguishes the three forms of liability. The first category 
requires the shared intent on the part of all members of the group to perpetrate 
the crime. Under the second category, which relates to systems of ill-treatment, 
such as detention camps, the accused must have personal knowledge of the 
system of ill-treatment as well as the intent to further the system. In the third 
category, the accused must intend to participate in and further the criminal 
activity of the group and to contribute to the JCE. For liability for crimes falling 
outside the common plan to be attributed to the accused, it must be foreseeable 
that a member of the group might perpetrate the crime and the accused must 
willingly take that risk. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals 
Judgment, ¶¶ 185-237 (July 15, 1999). For a more general explanation of the 
concept, see Verena Haan, The Development of the Concept of Joint Criminal 
Enterprise at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 
Int’l. Crim. L. Rev. 167 (2005). See also Antonio Cassese, The Oxford 
Companion to International Criminal Justice 391-96 (Oxford University Press 
2009). 
2 Duško Tadić was a Bosnian Serb from the Municipality of Prijedor in Bosnia. 
Prijedor was violently taken over by the Serbian Democratic Party together with 
Bosnian Serb forces on April 30, 1992. During this takeover, Bosnian Serb 
forces committed crimes against non-Serbs. Duško Tadić was charged with 31 
counts alleging grave breaches, war crimes and crimes against humanity 
committed against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats between May 23 and 
December 31, 1992 in Prijedor.  
3 JOHN R.W.D. JONES & STEVEN POWLES, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PRACTICE 
692 (Transnational Publishers 2003). 
4 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev. 41, Rule 73bis(B), (C) 
(Feb. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032_
Rev41_en.pdf. 
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of Rule 73bis was expanded significantly. Rule 73bis(D) was 
added to allow the trial chamber to fix the number of crime sites or 
incidents comprised in one or more of the charges with respect to 
which evidence may be presented by the prosecution before the 
beginning of a trial. In May 2006, two months after the death of 
Slobodan Milošević, Rule 73bis was amended in order to provide 
trial chambers with the power to “invite the Prosecutor to reduce 
the number of counts charged in the indictment” and “direct the 
Prosecutor to select the counts in the indictment on which to 
proceed.” 
¶3 The author argues that the development and proactive 
application of Rule 73bis in post-Milošević trials represents a 
positive and necessary step towards the prevention of unwieldy 
and overly complicated international criminal proceedings. Given 
the importance of the Rule 73bis powers as essential tools for 
judges at the pre-trial stage, the author advocates that similar 
powers, as appropriate, should be introduced and proactively used 
in other international and internationalized courts and tribunals.  
II. THE SCALE OF THE MILOŠEVIĆ INDICTMENT AND ISSUES OF 
MANAGEABILITY  
¶4 The trial of Slobodan Milošević began on February 12, 2002. 
On the first day of trial, Carla Del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor, 
correctly predicted that the trial would “challenge the very capacity 
of a modern criminal court to address crimes which . . . extend so 
far in time and place” and would “test the criminal justice 
process.”5  
¶5 The Kosovo indictment alleged that between January and 
June 1999, forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 
and Serbia, acting at the direction of or with the support of Mr. 
Milošević, executed a campaign of terror directed at Kosovo 
Albanian civilians with the objective of expelling a substantial 
portion of them from Kosovo to ensure Serbian control over the 
province. Mr. Milošević was charged on the basis of his de jure 
position as President of the FRY, Supreme Commander of the 
armed forces of the FRY (VJ), President of the Supreme Defence 
Counsel and his de facto authority. The Croatia indictment alleged 
                                                 
5 Transcript of Prosecutor’s Opening Statement at 5, Prosecutor v. Milošević, 
Case No. IT-02-54-T (Feb. 12, 2002).  
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inter alia that Mr. Milošević participated in a joint criminal 
enterprise between 1991 and 1992, the purpose of which was the 
forcible removal of the majority of the Croat and other non-Serb 
population from approximately one-third of the territory of 
Croatia. In the Bosnia indictment, the prosecution alleged that Mr. 
Milošević acted alone and with other members of a joint criminal 
enterprise to commit crimes by inter alia (i) exerting control over 
the JNA and the VJ which participated in the planning and forcible 
removal of the majority of non-Serbs; (ii) providing financial, 
logistical and political support to the Bosnian Serb army (VRS), 
the special forces of the Republic of Serbia MUP and the Serbian 
irregular forces or paramilitaries; and (iii) exercising substantial 
influence over and assisting the political leadership of Republika 
Srpska. A couple of months before the start of the trial, the 
prosecution applied to join the three separate indictments on the 
basis that they all concerned the same transaction. Namely, Mr. 
Milošević attempted to create a “Greater Serbia”—a centralized 
Serbian state encompassing the Serb-populated areas of Croatia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and all of Kosovo, and was alleged 
to have committed multiple crimes in the process.6  
¶6 The prosecution claimed that joinder would ensure that the 
“accused receives a fair and expeditious trial”7 and would also 
result in a “shorter and more consolidated overall trial timetable.”8 
Joinder would “avoid inconsistent verdicts and sentences and 
multiple appeals that may result if the Indictments [were to 
be] . . . tried piece-meal by different Trial Chambers.”9 The 
prosecution estimated that it would seek to call between 483 and 
600 witnesses during a trial lasting either three hundred days in 
total or about three years.10  
¶7 Concerned by both the impact of such a trial upon Mr. 
Milošević and the overall manageability of the case, the Amici 
Curiae advised the Chamber that it would have to “consider the 
                                                 
6 See Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case Nos. IT-99-37-PT, IT-01-50-PT, & IT-01-
51-I, Prosecution’s Motion for Joinder (Nov. 27, 2001). 
7 Id. ¶ 7. 
8 Id. ¶ 32.  
9 Id. ¶ 7. 
10 The reference to 483 witnesses can be located in the Pre-Trial Conference 
transcript. Transcript of Pre-Trial Conference at 125-27, Prosecutor v. 
Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T (Oct. 30, 2001). For the reference to 600 
witnesses, see Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case Nos. IT-99-37-PT, IT-01-50-PT, & 
IT-01-51-I, Prosecution’s Motion for Joinder, ¶ 41 (Nov. 27, 2001). 
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extreme scale of the single trial exercise and whether [it was] able 
to deal adequately with all the charges within the 3 indictments.”11 
Mr. Milošević took the position that it would soon “become clear 
on what shaky legs this whole thing [stood].”12  
¶8 The Trial Chamber ordered the Kosovo Indictment to be tried 
separately and allowed the joinder of the Croatia and Bosnia 
Indictments to be tried subsequently. The Trial Chamber did not 
accept the prosecution’s theory of the Greater Serbia golden thread 
and observed that no mention of a Greater Serbia plan appeared in 
the Kosovo indictment and that it was only in relation to other 
individuals that the plan was mentioned in the Bosnia and Croatia 
Indictments. The Trial Chamber considered that nexus too 
nebulous to point to the existence of a common scheme, strategy or 
plan required for the same transaction test under Rule 49 of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The Chamber noted that a gap of 
more than three years had elapsed between the last events in 
Bosnia and the first events in Kosovo.13 It opined that in 
contradistinction to the conflict in Kosovo, the conflicts in Croatia 
and Bosnia did not take place in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) but in neighboring states; and must be seen 
against the background of conflicts arising from the break-up of 
the former Yugoslavia. The Trial Chamber stated that on the other 
hand, the conflict in Kosovo occurred in a province of the FRY in 
                                                 
11 Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case Nos. IT-99-37-PT, IT-01-50-PT, & IT-01-51-I, 
Amici Curiae Response to the Prosecution Motion on Joinder, ¶ 10 (Dec. 5, 
2001). The Trial Chamber ordered the appointment of Amici Curiae following 
Mr. Milošević’s assertion of his right to represent himself. Their role was not to 
represent the accused, but rather to provide assistance to the Chamber in 
ensuring the fairness of the trial. See Transcript of Status Conference at 15-18, 
Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-99-37-PT (Aug. 30 2001); Prosecutor v. 
Milošević, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Order Inviting Designation of Amicus Curiae 
(Aug. 30, 2001); Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Order 
Concerning Amici Curiae (Jan. 11, 2002). The Chamber ordered that the Amici 
would assist the Trial Chamber by (i) making any submissions properly open to 
the accused by way of preliminary motions or objections to evidence during the 
trial and cross-examining witnesses as appropriate; (ii) drawing to the attention 
of the Trial Chamber any exculpatory or mitigating evidence; and (iii) acting in 
any other way considered appropriate in order to secure a fair trial. Prosecutor v. 
Milošević, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Order Inviting Designation of Amicus 
Curiae, at 2 (Aug. 30, 2001). 
12 Transcript of Hearing on Prosecution’s Motion for Joinder at 140, Prosecutor 
v. Milošević, Case Nos. IT-99-37-PT, IT-01-50-PT, & IT-01-51-I (Dec. 11, 
2001). 
13 Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case Nos. IT-99-37-PT, IT-01-50-PT, & IT-01-51-I, 
Decision on Prosecution Motion for Joinder, ¶ 42 (Dec. 13, 2001). 
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relation to which Mr. Milošević was alleged to have acted directly 
and was in de jure and de facto control of the VJ. The Chamber 
was particularly concerned that the weight of a single trial would 
be excessively onerous and prejudicial to Mr. Milošević and that 
the trial would become unmanageable.14 Subsequently on appeal, 
the Appeals Chamber ordered the three indictments to be tried 
together on the basis that the acts alleged therein formed part of the 
same transaction. The Chamber placed a heavy responsibility on 
the prosecution to ensure that the single trial which it wanted did 
not “become unmanageable by overloading the Trial Chamber and 
the Defence with unnecessary material.”15  
¶9 The Appeals Chamber acknowledged that the resulting trial 
would be undoubtedly long and complex and that the prosecution 
“must ensure that only essential evidence to prove its case is 
presented, and that inessential evidence is discarded.”16 The 
Appeals Chamber warned that if the prosecution failed to 
discharge its responsibility, the Trial Chamber had sufficient 
powers to order the prosecution to reduce its list of witnesses to 
ensure that the trial remained as manageable as possible. The 
Appeals Chamber also left open the possibility that if: 
with the benefit of hindsight it becomes 
apparent…that the trial has developed in such a way 
as to become unmanageable – especially if, for 
example, the prosecution is either incapable or 
unwilling to exercise the responsibility which it 
bears to exercise restraint in relation to the evidence 
it produces – it will still be open to the Trial 
Chamber at that stage to order a severance of the 
charges arising out of one or more of the three areas 
of the former Yugoslavia. Nothing in the present 
Decision or in these reasons will prevent it from 
doing so.17  
                                                 
14 Id. ¶¶ 43, 44. 
15 Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case Nos. IT-99-37-AR73, IT-01-50-AR73, & IT-
01-51-AR73, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution Interlocutory Appeal from 
Refusal to Order Joinder, ¶ 25 (Apr. 18, 2002). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. ¶ 26.  
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The Appeals Chamber determined that two successive trials would 
“inevitably take even longer” than a single trial.18 The importance 
of breaks in the proceedings was reiterated in order to allow the 
parties to “marshal their forces and, if need be, for the 
unrepresented accused to rest from the work involved.”19 
¶10 The Appeals Chamber explained that the “responsibility for 
the accused’s decision not to avail himself of defence counsel” 
could not be shifted to the Tribunal.20 When asked for his opinion 
on the issue of joinder, the Appeals Chamber noted that the 
accused merely criticized the prosecution’s reliance upon reasons 
of judicial economy and stated that the prosecution “certainly don’t 
care whether I will be fatigued or not.”21 Mr. Milošević was asked 
by the Appeals Chamber whether he would prefer to defend 
himself in a single trial. His reply was predictable: “how you are 
going to conduct your proceedings, that’s up to you. I will give you 
no suggestions regarding that.”22 
¶11 In retrospect, His Honor Judge May’s pre-trial concerns that 
a single trial of the scale sought by the prosecution would not be 
“manageable” were well-founded.23 On numerous occasions 
                                                 
18 Id. ¶ 27. 
19 Id.  
20 Id. 
21 Transcript of Trial Chamber Hearing at 134, Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case 
Nos. IT-99-37-PT, IT-01-50-PT, & IT-01-51-I (Dec. 11, 2001). 
22 Transcript of Interlocutory Appeal Hearing at 352, Prosecutor v. Milošević, 
Case Nos. IT-99-37-AR73, IT-01-50-AR73, & IT-01-51-AR73 (Jan. 30, 2002). 
23 Transcript of Trial Chamber Hearing at 89, Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case 
Nos. IT-99-37-PT, IT-01-50-PT, & IT-01-51-I (Dec. 11, 2001). His Honour 
Judge May: “And there is, of course, behind all this - while I am dealing with 
these matters - there is behind all this the manageability of the trial. I know you 
haven’t reached that, and no doubt you will, of course, address us on it, but the 
sort of trial which you are arguing for, involving some 600 witnesses and lasting 
- I don't know how long you anticipate, Mr. Nice - but lasting some two to three 
years, is not one which at the moment would appear to be very manageable.” 
This concern was also voiced by the Amici Curiae during the interlocutory 
appeal hearing on 30 January 2002 by Mr. Kay QC: “Another of our arguments 
which we left very much with the Judges and did feature in their judgment was 
the unmanageability of the case, whether the Judges felt that handling all those 
three issues, three indictments, that they were given birth to individually, they 
were considered separately, dealing with all those three at the same time, it was 
a matter, as we saw it, for the Judges to decide whether what had been presented 
to them by the Office of the Prosecutor in their conduct of the matter, whether 
that was manageable in the form that was being presented before the Court.” 
Transcript of Interlocutory Appeal Hearing at 369, Prosecutor v. Milošević, 
Case Nos. IT-99-37-AR73, IT-01-50-AR73, & IT-01-51-AR73 (Jan. 30, 2002). 
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throughout the proceedings, Mr. Milošević complained about the 
overwhelming volume of prosecution disclosure and the crushing 
scale of the case. Mr. Milošević also protested the inability of the 
system to handle the timely translation of the amount of potential 
evidence he wanted to use at trial.  
¶12 During the presentation of the prosecution’s case, it became 
clear that even the resources of the Office of the Prosecutor could 
not cope with the procedural burdens generated by the scale of trial 
it had requested. The prosecution applied to change its witness list 
on at least thirty separate occasions and sought numerous 
extensions of time in which to present its case.24 Even after 250 
days of hearing, nineteen months of trial and 244 witnesses, the 
prosecution had still not produced a definitive witness list with 
respect to those witnesses it intended to call for the remainder of its 
case.25 Neither had the prosecution provided a similarly definitive 
exhibit list.26 The procedural and substantive demands of the trial 
upon all parties were excessive.  
¶13 On a practical level, a brief overview of the number of 
exhibits, transcripts, filings and prosecution disclosure reveals the 
extraordinary amount of material which had to be processed during 
the trial. By November 2005, the prosecution had served in excess 
of 1.2 million pages of disclosure. Transcripts of the proceedings 
exceeded 46,000 pages. The trial record consisted of more than 
85,000 pages of prosecution exhibits and over 100 videos. The 
written filings amounted to 2,600 separate briefs, motions, replies 
and responses.  
¶14 In terms of legal analysis, the scale of the sixty-six count 
indictment consisted of twenty-three different types of crimes 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Prosecution’s Motion 
for Leave to Amend the Witness List and Request Protective Measures for 
Sensitive Source Witnesses (Feb. 5, 2003); Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. 
IT-02-54-T, Prosecution’s Further Omnibus Motion for Leave to Amend the 
Witness List and Request Protective Measures for Sensitive Source Witnesses 
(Apr. 11, 2003); Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Prosecution’s 
Third Omnibus Motion for Leave to Amend the Witness List and Request 
Protective Measures for Sensitive Source Witnesses (June 23,2003); Prosecutor 
v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order to the Prosecution to Finalise Its 
Witness List, (Sept. 30, 2003); Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, 
Order to the Prosecution to Finalise Its List of Exhibits (Nov. 4, 2003). 
25 Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order to the Prosecution to 
Finalise Its Witness List (Sept. 30, 2003).  
26 Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order to the Prosecution to 
Finalise Its List of Exhibits (Nov. 4, 2003).  
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charged pursuant to two forms of individual criminal 
responsibility. The crimes included grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions, violations of the laws and customs of war, crimes 
against humanity and genocide. Mr. Milošević was charged 
pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute with having planned, 
instigated, ordered and committed crimes pursuant to a joint 
criminal enterprise with other individuals.27 He was also charged 
under Article 7(3) with responsibility for the crimes of his 
subordinates as a superior who knew or had reason to know that 
the subordinates were about to commit the crimes.28  
¶15 In terms of the complexity of the factual analysis of the 
evidence, one count of deportation in Kosovo encompassed 
allegations that Mr. Milošević was responsible for this particular 
crime in at least sixty-four different locations within thirteen 
municipalities, pursuant to eight different forms of conduct.  
¶16 In addition to the scale of the documentation and the 
complexity of the factual and legal issues, the Trial Chamber was 
constantly confronted with issues of fairness which resulted 
directly from the extensive scope of the indictment. These issues 
included matters relating to the timely translation of documentation 
for production as potential exhibits in the trial, the disclosure of 
evidence and exculpatory material to the defendant, and the 
allocation of time for the examination and cross-examination of 
witnesses.  
¶17 It is noteworthy that in the pre-trial phase in Milošević, the 
Chamber did not have the power to fix the number of crime sites or 
incidents in the indictment or invite the prosecution to reduce or 
select the counts on which to proceed.29 The Chamber did, 
however, consider the possibility of severance of the Kosovo 
indictment to ensure that the trial would be “concluded in a fair 
                                                 
27 Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Second Amended Indictment 
[Croatia] (Oct. 23, 2002); Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, 
Amended Indictment [Bosnia and Herzegovina] (Nov. 22, 2002); Prosecutor v. 
Milošević, Case No. IT-99-37, Indictment [Kosovo] (May 22, 1999). 
28 Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Second Amended Indictment 
[Croatia], at 5-6 (Oct. 23, 2002); Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, 
Amended Indictment [Bosnia and Herzegovina], at 5-6 (Nov. 22, 2002); 
Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-99-37, Indictment [Kosovo], at 11 (May 
22, 1999).  
29 These amendments to Rule 73bis(D) were introduced on July 17, 2003 and 
May 30, 2006, respectively. 
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and expeditious manner” on two separate occasions.30 Given the 
opposition to severance by the parties in 2004, the Chamber 
declined to consider the matter further until sixteen months later, 
when it became increasingly concerned by the length of the trial. 
At a hearing on November 29, 2005, both the prosecution and Mr. 
Milošević vehemently opposed severance.31 Prior to the decision 
on severance, on December 8, 2005, the Trial Chamber held a 
further hearing to deal with the related question of time to be 
allotted to present the defense case. In February 2004, it had 
allotted Mr. Milošević the same amount of court time as the 
prosecution in which to present his case. During the hearing in 
December, however, Mr. Milošević requested an additional 380 
hours. On December 12, 2005, the Trial Chamber rejected the 
defendant’s request and concluded that he had failed to take a 
reasonable approach to the presentation of his case. The Chamber 
determined that because its rejection of Mr. Milošević’s request 
“should lead to the conclusion of the trial within the anticipated 
time scale,” it was not appropriate to sever the Kosovo 
Indictment.32  
¶18 Today, the question remains as to whether or not a severed 
Kosovo trial as originally contemplated by the Trial Chamber 
would have increased the fairness and expediency of the 
proceedings, bearing in mind the absence of pre-trial 73bis(D) and 
(E) powers in 2001. The Kosovo indictment, although factually 
intricate, contained only five counts. A trial on this indictment 
alone could have been concluded within a relatively short time. 
Support for this proposition is taken from an analysis of the time 
taken to try six defendants in the case of Milutinović, on the five 
Kosovo counts. The trial lasted only twenty-five months.33 The 
                                                 
30 Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Further Order on Future 
Conduct of the Trial Relating to Severance of One or More Indictments (July 21, 
2004); Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision in Relation to 
Severance, Extension of Time and Rest (Dec. 12, 2005). 
31 Transcript of Trial Chamber Hearing at 46640-66, 46676-77, 46688-96, 
Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T (Nov. 29, 2005). 
32 Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision in Relation to 
Severance, Extension of Time and Rest, ¶ 27 (Dec. 12, 2005). 
33 Milan Milutinović, the former President of Serbia, was charged with five 
other defendants (Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, 
Nebojša Pavković, Vladimir Lazarević and Sreten. Lukić) for crimes in Kosovo 
in 1999. Mr. Milutinović was acquitted on February 26, 2009. From the case 
information sheet on the ICTY website, the trial started on July 10, 2006 with 
closing arguments between August 19-27, 2008, available at 
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efficient management of this trial was undoubtedly increased as a 
result of the prudent use of pre-trial 73bis powers to limit the 
number of incidents and crime sites on which evidence was led by 
the prosecution.  
¶19 However, notwithstanding this difference, a focused trial on 
the allegations contained in the Kosovo indictment alone would 
have enabled Mr. Milošević to concentrate on one aspect of the 
conflict within clear temporal and geographical boundaries. Such 
focus would also have reduced the physical and mental burden of 
analysis and preparation upon Mr. Milošević, caused by the 
overwhelming disclosure of prosecution materials pertaining to all 
three territories (Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia) covering a decade of 
war. At the conclusion of the Kosovo trial, the prosecution could 
then have considered whether or not it was in the interests of 
justice to try the defendant with respect to the other indictments 
pertaining to Bosnia and Croatia, and if so, when, given his right to 
adequate time to prepare his defense. 
III. COMPATIBILITY OF A SINGLE TRIAL WITH THE RIGHTS OF THE 
ACCUSED  
¶20 From the defense perspective, one fundamental question is 
whether or not a single trial of Milošević proportions is compatible 
with the fundamental rights of an accused. Pursuant to Article 
20(1) of the Statute of the ICTY, a trial chamber has a duty to 
ensure that the trial is “fair and expeditious” and conducted with 
“full respect for the rights of the accused.”34 The minimum 
guarantees afforded to an accused include the right to be informed 
in detail of the nature of the charges against him;35 the right to 
                                                                                                             
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/cis/en/cis_milutinovic_al_en_1.pdf.  
 
34 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Art. 
20(1), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (“The Trial 
Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings 
are conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure and evidence, with full 
respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims 
and witnesses.”). 
35STEFAN TRECHSEL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 193 (Oxford 
University Press 2005) (“The purpose of this clause seems clear: the right to 
defend oneself can only be exercised effectively, i.e. with a minimum of chances 
of success, if the accused knows what he or she is accused of.”). 
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adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense;36 
and the right to be tried without undue delay,37 which requires not 
only a speedy commencement of trial, but also an expeditious 
conclusion.  
¶21 A trial of sixty-six counts over a ten year period of war is one 
which not only challenges the capacity of an international criminal 
tribunal but also requires particular attention to be paid to the 
protection of the rights of an accused. Has the accused had 
adequate notice of the detail of the case he faces? If so, is the detail 
of the case and the extent of the disclosure so overwhelming that 
the trial becomes unfair? The accused must be in a position to 
review and process incoming disclosure effectively, in order to 
know in advance the nature of the prosecution’s case and the 
evidence to be called at trial. Ongoing disclosure by the 
prosecution throughout the trial makes it more difficult for the 
defense to ensure that all material has been properly sifted and 
reviewed in a timely manner. Regard must also be paid to whether 
or not the defense has adequate preparation time and resources to 
deal with the scale of the prosecution’s case as well as sufficient 
time to cross-examine the witnesses and challenge the content of 
the documents sought to be produced. Such issues need to be 
tackled when attempting to deal with the practical impact of 
prosecuting and defending mega-trials of one or more individuals. 
Furthermore, as Judge Bonomy has observed, “[t]he inherent 
challenges of conducting a large-scale war crimes trial are further 
exacerbated when the accused chooses to represent himself.”38  
                                                 
36SALVATORE ZAPPALA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS 124 (Oxford University Press 2003) (explaining that “the issue of 
adequate time for the preparation of the defence . . . must be read in correlation 
with the right of the accused to be tried without undue delay and that it is the 
duty of the Trial Chambers to ensure expeditious trials.”). 
37 TRECHSEL, supra note 36, at 135 (“Prolonged proceedings can put a 
considerable strain on accused persons and have the potential to exacerbate 
existing concerns such as uncertainty as to the future, fear of conviction, and the 
threat of a sanction of an unknown severity.”).  
38 Iain Bonomy, The Reality of Conducting a War Crimes Trial, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. 
JUST. 348, 348 (2007).  
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IV. THE DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF RULE 73BIS POST 
MILOŠEVIĆ 
¶22 The introduction of extended Rule 73bis powers in July 2003 
and May 2006 has already had an impact on the fair and 
expeditious conduct of proceedings before the ICTY. The 
application of these powers in several trials including 
Milutinović,39 Šešelj40 and Dragomir Milošević41 should encourage 
other trial chambers to assess the size, scope and scale of the 
proceedings at the pre-trial stage and engage in careful analysis as 
to whether or not to invite the prosecution to reduce the number of 
counts charged, fix the crime sites and incidents, and direct the 
prosecution to select the counts on which to proceed.42  
¶23 In Milutinović, at the invitation of the defense, the Trial 
Chamber reduced the scale of the five count indictment by 
disallowing the calling of crime-based evidence with respect to 
three killing sites, namely Račak/Reçak, Padaliste/Padalishte and 
Dubrava/Dubravë prison.43 The Chamber used its powers under 
Rule 73bis to fix the number of crime sites and incidents on which 
evidence would be led by the prosecution at trial; these powers 
were introduced in July 2003. The Chamber applied the Rule 73bis 
powers at the pre-trial stage due to the number of witnesses 
scheduled for the prosecution’s case in chief, the prosecution’s 
estimate that the examination-in-chief of these witnesses would 
                                                 
39Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Decision on Application of 
Rule 73bis (July 11, 2006); Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, 
Decision Denying Prosecution’s Request for Certification of Rule 73bis Issue 
for Appeal (Aug. 30, 2006). 
40Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on the Application of 
Rule 73bis (Nov. 8, 2006); Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Order on 
Time Allocated to the Prosecution Pursuant to Rule 73bis of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (Nov. 13, 2007). 
41 Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT, Decision on 
Amendment of the Indictment and Application of Rule 73bis(D) (Dec. 12, 
2006). 
42 See Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT, Amended 
Indictment, ¶¶ 22-25 (Dec. 18, 2006). The indictment in Dragomir Milošević 
contained five counts charging the accused with deportation as a crime against 
humanity, forcible transfer as “other inhumane acts” as a crime against 
humanity, murder as a crime against humanity, murder as a violation of the laws 
or customs of war, and persecution as a crime against humanity, respectively in 
several municipalities in Kosovo. 
43 Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Decision on Application of 
Rule 73bis, ¶ 6 (July 11, 2006). 
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last for 280 hours, the fact that the trial involved six accused, and 
the prospect of the trial extending beyond two years.44 
¶24 The prosecution tried to resist the application of Rule 73bis 
submitting that it should not be interpreted so as to allow the 
Chamber to fix the particular crime sites on which evidence may 
be led at trial as it would “[allow] the judiciary to intrude in the 
area of what should be the Prosecution’s bailiwick. . . . the 
Prosecution should be in the best position to determine what’s 
representative of their case.”45 The Chamber rejected this 
interpretation and stated that it was “unnecessarily cumbersome” 
and inconsistent with a proper construction of the Rule which 
empowers the Chamber “[a]fter having heard the Prosecutor, to fix 
a number of crime sites or incidents . . . which having regard to all 
the relevant circumstances . . . are reasonably representative of the 
crimes charged.”46 The Chamber recognized its obligation to 
ensure that the Rule’s requirement of reasonable representativeness 
is met, and focused on identifying those crime sites or incidents 
which were clearly different from the fundamental nature or theme 
of the case. In doing so, the Chamber identified three killing sites, 
each of which was “associated with a single alleged attack or a 
discrete set of events that form[ed] part of one distinct alleged 
criminal transaction or incident.”47 None of the three sites were 
associated with the prosecution’s main theme of the case, namely 
the deportation and forcible transfer of Kosovo Albanians. The 
Chamber left open the possibility that evidence with respect to 
these three sites or incidents may eventually be permitted pursuant 
to Rule 73bis(F), depending on how the case develops, should the 
Chamber conclude that it is necessary to hear such evidence in 
order to have a full appreciation of the events giving rise to these 
criminal proceedings.48 Following the Trial Chamber’s judgment 
on February 26, 2009, the Trial Chamber invited the parties to 
make submissions as to how to proceed in relation to the three 
crimes of Račak/Reçak, Padaliste/Padalishte and Dubrava/Dubravë 
                                                 
44 Id. ¶ 2. 
45 Transcript of Pre-Trial Conference at 374, Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case 
No. IT-05-87-PT (July 7, 2006). 
46 Prosecutor v. Milutinović., Case No. IT-05-87-T, Decision on Application of 
Rule 73bis, ¶ 9 (July 11, 2006). 
47 Id. ¶ 11. 
48 Id. ¶ 12. 
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prison.49 The prosecution submitted that in light of the Trial 
Chamber’s decision on Rule 73bis, and the awareness and conduct 
of the parties throughout the trial, “the only reasonable 
conclusion . . . was that the three crime sites’ charges were 
removed from the indictment and were not part of the trial.”50 
¶25 In the case of Šešelj,51 the Chamber invited the prosecution 
under Rule 73bis(D) to propose means of reducing the scope of the 
indictment by at least one-third by reducing the number of counts, 
crime sites or incidents comprised in one or more of the charges in 
the indictment, or both.52 Initially, the prosecution declined the 
invitation and submitted that a reduction of the indictment was 
“unnecessary” and would result in a case that was not “reasonably 
representative of the crimes charged,” impeding the prosecution’s 
ability to prove its case.53 The prosecution requested another 
opportunity to submit a proposal for reducing the indictment 
should the Chamber require it to do so. A further request made by 
the Chamber54 resulted in the prosecutor dropping five counts from 
the indictment and removing charges relating to Western Slavonia, 
Brcko, Bijeljna and a crime site in Nevesinje.55 The Chamber 
granted the prosecution’s request to call non-crime evidence in 
relation to these sites as relevant inter alia to evidence of pattern or 
proof of the purpose and methods of the alleged joint criminal 
                                                 
49 Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 
vol. III, ¶ 1213 (Feb. 26, 2009). 
50 Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Prosecution Submission with 
Respect to Rule 73bis(D) Decision of July 11, 2006, ¶ 8 (Mar. 12, 2009). 
51 See Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Modified Amended 
Indictment, ¶¶ 15-34 (Jul. 12, 2005). Vojislav Šešelj is currently president of the 
Serbian Radical Party. He surrendered to the ICTY on February 23, 2003 and is 
charged with crimes of persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, 
inhumane acts, murder, torture, cruel treatment and destruction in Croatia and 
Bosnia between August 1991 until at least September 1993.  
52 Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Request to the Prosecutor to 
Make Proposals to Reduce the Scope of the Indictment (Aug. 31, 2006). 
53 Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Prosecution’s Response to Trial 
Chamber’s “Request to the Prosecutor to Make Proposals to Reduce the Scope 
of the Indictment” (Sept. 12, 2006). 
54 See Transcript of Status Conference, Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-
PT (Sept. 14, 2006). 
55 Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Prosecution’s Submission of 
Proposals to Reduce the Scope of the Indictment, ¶¶ 4-11 (Sept. 21, 2006). In 
addition, the Chamber proprio motu decided that evidence (with the exception 
of non-crime based evidence) should not be presented with respect to the 
municipality of Bosanski Samac.  
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enterprise. The use of Rule 73bis powers in this case led to a 
significant reduction in both the counts and the crime site 
locations.  
¶26 In Dragomir Milošević,56 the Chamber made the same 
request of the prosecution and invited it to reduce the scope of its 
case by at least one third pursuant to Rule 73bis. The prosecution 
was also invited to reconsider the overall number of witnesses and 
exhibits in support of the charges. In response to the invitation, the 
Chamber accepted the prosecution’s proposal to remove sixteen 
incidents from the indictment which resulted in a ninety-three hour 
reduction in time for viva voce witness evidence. The prosecution 
also proposed to remove fifty-four witnesses from its witness list, 
another measure approved by the Chamber which held that the 
Prosecutor would still be able to present evidence that was 
“reasonably representative of the crimes charged.”57 It was 
unnecessary in the circumstances to remove any of the counts from 
the indictment.  
¶27 In Haradinaj,58 the Chamber requested the prosecution to 
explain the reason why eight of the counts in the indictment should 
not be removed.59 The prosecution argued that a reduction of the 
charges would “jeopardize” the case and violate the prosecution’s 
right to a fair trial resulting in charges which are not “reasonably 
representative” of the case as a whole.60  
                                                 
56 See Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, Judgment, vol. III, ¶¶ 
1006-08 (Dec. 12, 2007). Dragomir Milošević has been sentenced to 33 years 
imprisonment for his role as Chief of Staff to Stanislav Galić, Commander of the 
Sarajevo Romanija Corps of the Bosnian Serb Army in 1993 and his subsequent 
position as Commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps of the Bosnian Serb 
Army in 1994. He is alleged to have conducted various strikes against the 
civilian population of Sarajevo, which amount to crimes against humanity and 
war crimes. This case is currently pending before the Appeal Chamber. 
57 Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT, Decision on 
Amendment of the Indictment and Application of Rule 73bis(D), ¶¶ 38-39 (Dec. 
12, 2006). 
58 See Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, vol. I, ¶¶ 502-05 (Apr. 3, 
2008). Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj were charged with 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. Ramush Haradinaj and Idriz Balaj 
were found not guilty of all charges, while Lahi Brahimaj was found guilty of 
cruel treatment and torture and sentenced to six years imprisonment. This case 
against all three accused is currently pending appeal. 
59 Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-PT, Decision Pursuant to Rule 
73bis(D), ¶ 1 (Feb. 22, 2007). 
60 Id. ¶ 7 (quoting Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-PT, Prosecution’s 
Response to Trial Chamber’s “Request to the Prosecutor to Make Proposals to 
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¶28 The prosecution argued that it must prove “broad allegations, 
such as the existence of a joint criminal enterprise and a 
widespread or systematic attack, and it must substantiate these 
allegations with relatively few victims and incidents.”61 Any 
reduction in counts or incidents “would not result in significant 
time savings and the Prosecutor may be forced to reduce its case in 
the future due to the potential unavailability of witnesses.”62 In this 
particular case, the Chamber was “persuaded by the Prosecutor’s 
submissions.”63 In particular, the Chamber agreed that the removal 
of counts may “result in an indictment that is no longer reasonably 
representative of the case as a whole and . . . may affect the 
Prosecutor’s ability to present evidence on the scope of the alleged 
widespread or systematic attack and joint criminal enterprise.”64  
¶29 In Stanisić, the two accused are charged with four counts of 
crimes against humanity and one count of violations of the laws or 
customs of war.65 The Trial Chamber employed the same standard 
request under Rule 73bis(D) in which it invited the Prosecution to 
reduce the number of counts or incidents by one third.66  
¶30 Initially, the prosecution declined the invitation but also 
outlined ways in which the scope of the indictment could be 
reduced. It was stressed however that even if crimes sites and 
incidents were removed, the prosecution would still seek to rely on 
                                                                                                             
Reduce the Size of the Indictment,” ¶ 4 (Feb. 13, 2007)). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. ¶ 8 (quoting Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-PT, Prosecution’s 
Response to Trial Chamber’s “Request to the Prosecutor to Make Proposals to 
Reduce the Size of the Indictment,” ¶ 4 (Feb. 13, 2007)). 
63 Id. ¶ 9. 
64 Id. ¶ 9; see also ¶ 11 (“The Chamber recognises that the Prosecutor 
announced a reduction in its case presentation at the same time that the Chamber 
invited the Prosecutor to reduce the indictment, and that the Prosecutor must 
now rely on a relatively small number of victims and witnesses in order to prove 
broad allegations.”).  
65 See Prosecutor v. Stanisić, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Prosecution Notice of 
Third Amended Indictment (July 10, 2008). Jovica Stanišić and Franko 
Simatović, in their roles of Head of the State Security Service and intelligence 
personnel, respectively, are alleged to have participated in a joint criminal 
enterprise with the purpose of forcibly and permanently removing non-Serbs 
from large areas of both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both are charged 
with crimes against humanity and war crimes. This case is currently at the pre-
trial phase. 
66 Prosecutor v. Stanisić, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Request to the Prosecution 
Pursuant to Rule 73bis(D) to Reduce the Scope of the Indictment, at 3 (Nov. 9, 
2007). 
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any evidence that goes to proof of the “purpose and methods of the 
JCE, the acts and conduct of the Accused, and the high degree of 
coordination and cooperation of the diverse groups of individuals 
and the institutions they represented within the JCE.”67 The Trial 
Chamber held that it would “only be in very exceptional 
circumstances that a case cannot be reduced within the terms of 
Rule 73bis(D).”68 The prosecution argued that its case “inherently 
requires evidence of a sufficient number of crime sites and 
incidents to prove the modes of liability alleged.”69 Further, any 
reduction in the indictment would result in charges “that are no 
longer reasonably representative of the Prosecution’s case as a 
whole.”70 Such a reduction would also risk the creation of an 
inaccurate historical record. This argument was immediately 
dismissed however by the Trial Chamber on the basis that “the 
Tribunal was established to administer justice, and not to create a 
historical record.”71 
¶31 The Chamber determined that the reductions in the 
Indictment suggested by the prosecution were “equally and 
proportionally distributed among the three regions where the 
crimes were alleged to have occurred.”72 Reduction would not 
jeopardize the prosecution’s ability to prove the victimization of 
the three ethnic communities. The Chamber accepted the proposed 
reduction of ten incidents, which left intact another 18 incidents. 
None of the counts were reduced.  
¶32 In Perišić, the Trial Chamber stated that the purpose of Rule 
73bis was to “prevent excessive and unnecessary time being taken 
by the Prosecution” in the presentation of its case.73 Momčilo 
Perišić, who was Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army 
(VJ) from August 1993 to November 1998, was charged with eight 
counts of crimes against humanity and five counts of violations of 
the laws or customs of war. The amended indictment contains four 
                                                 
67 Prosecutor v. Stanisić, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Prosecution Response to the 
Trial Chamber’s “Request to the Prosecution Pursuant to Rule 73bis(D) to 
Reduce the Indictment,” ¶ 44 (Dec. 3, 2007). 
68 Prosecutor v. Stanisić, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision Pursuant to Rule 
73bis(D), ¶ 11 (Feb. 4, 2008). 
69 Id. ¶ 16. 
70 Id. ¶ 19. 
71 Id. ¶ 21. 
72 Id. ¶ 23. 
73 Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-PT, Decision on Application of Rule 
73bis and Amendment of Indictment, ¶ 9 (May 15, 2007). 
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schedules which list specific incidents pertaining to the shelling 
and sniping of Sarajevo (schedules A and B), shelling of the city of 
Zagreb (schedule C) and killings in Srebrenica (schedule D).  
¶33 The Chamber invited the prosecution to reduce the scope of 
its amended indictment by one-third which was declined, although 
the prosecution proposed not presenting evidence in respect of an 
allegation concerning the shelling of Zagreb. The Trial Chamber 
noted that such a proposal amounted to a reduction of only “four 
percent of the crime base allegations.”74 The Chamber determined 
that at least twenty-two witnesses were scheduled to give evidence 
on terror in Sarajevo, even though the indictment did not contain a 
terror count and there was no indication that the allegation of a 
“protracted campaign of sniping and shelling” of Sarajevo was 
alleged in support of a charge of terror against the accused. 
Concerning Sarajevo, the Chamber instructed the prosecution to 
lead only evidence in relation to scheduled incidents, as opposed to 
unscheduled incidents which had been part of the intended 
prosecution’s case in chief. The prosecution would only be allowed 
to lead evidence on unscheduled incidents if it could show that 
such evidence was “essential to prove an important aspect of the 
case.”75  
V. CONCLUSION  
¶34 In considering whether or not the availability of Rule 73bis 
powers at the pre-trial stage would have made a difference to the 
fairness and expediency of the proceedings in Milošević, it is 
necessary to bear in mind Judge Kwon’s incisive observation that 
the application of Rule 73bis requires the pre-trial judges to have a 
“comprehensive and intimate understanding of the Prosecution’s 
case.”76 As Judge Kwon observes, Judge Bonomy’s ability to apply 
the Rule 73bis powers in Milutinović was evidently influenced by 
his familiarity with the substance of that case, given its similarity 
to the Kosovo indictment in Milošević, a trial he had worked on for 
                                                 
74 Id. ¶ 6. 
75 Id. ¶ 17; see also Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Decision on 
Prosecution’s Submission on Interpretation of the Trial Chamber’s Decision of 
15 May 2007 Regarding “Unscheduled Incidents” (Oct. 31, 2008). 
76 O-Gon Kwon, The Challenge of an International Criminal Trial as Seen from 
the Bench, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 360, 375 (2007). See also Bonomy, supra note 
40, at 354. 
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several years. Even if the powers had been available to the pre-trial 
bench in Milošević, the question arises as to whether or not the 
Chamber in the particular circumstances of that case would have 
had such familiarity with the prosecution’s case so as to allow 
them to implement the Rule given the range of the sixty-six counts 
in the joined indictment. In Milošević, perhaps the most 
appropriate option would have been to sever the Kosovo 
indictment during the trial, an option which had been left open by 
the Appeals Chamber’s decision on joinder.  
¶35 The powers of Rule 73bis are not without controversy. 
Prosecutors at the ICTY have voiced their discomfort with the 
ability of judges to put limits on the remit of an indictment. Rule 
73bis(E) has been described as “troublesome” and a “boon to an 
accused person” as implementation of the Rule “forces the 
Prosecution to abandon counts in an indictment thereby 
eliminating the possibility of establishing the breadth of an accused 
person’s provable criminality.”77 
¶36 Notwithstanding the reservations of the prosecution, the 
author maintains that the Rule 73bis powers are nonetheless an 
important tool in the possession of the pre-trial chamber. The tool 
is particularly useful in circumstances of prosecutorial reluctance 
to reduce the scope of an indictment to manageable proportions. 
Such reluctance to try Milošević on a severed Kosovo indictment 
was described by one of the Trial Judges as reflective of the 
prosecution’s desire to conduct a “hunting expedition.”78 Judge 
Kwon explained that “by charging the accused with more crimes 
through more modes of responsibility, the Prosecutor apparently 
believes that she stands a greater chance of convicting the accused 
on at least one charge.”79 Judge Kwon noted the persistent 
resistance of the prosecution even as late as December 2005, when 
the Trial Chamber “proposed severing the Kosovo indictment and 
rendering judgment on it before rendering judgment on the other 
two indictments.”80  
¶37 In the event of a lack of prosecutorial will to focus future 
indictments in international criminal trials, appropriate intervention 
                                                 
77 Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary 
Crimes, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 683, 697 n.56 (2007). 
78 Kwon, supra note 78, at 373. 
79 Id. 
80 Id.; see also Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision in 
Relation to Severance, Extension of Time and Rest, ¶ 12 (Dec. 12, 2005). 
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and trial management by the chamber at the pre-trial stage will 
help to ensure that the cases are kept within reasonable parameters. 
Although the particular tools may vary in order to suit the needs of 
the institution, the presence of pre-trial mechanisms to encourage 
judicial control of the proceedings is essential in order to guard 
against prosecutorial excess.  
¶38 In proceedings before the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
both the prosecution and the pre-trial chamber have worked at the 
confirmation hearing stage to narrow the scope of indictments. The 
prosecution has adopted a policy of selecting a limited number of 
incidents and as few witnesses as possible are called to testify.81 
Such a policy allows the prosecution to “carry out short 
investigations and propose expeditious trials while aiming to 
represent the entire range of criminality.”82 In practice, this has 
resulted in trials which are limited in scope. In Lubanga, the 
accused is charged only with enlisting, conscripting and using 
children under the age of fifteen into the Patriotic Forces for the 
Liberation of Congo.83 In Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, although 
the accused were initially charged with thirteen counts, the number 
of counts was reduced to ten by the Pre-Trial Chamber at the 
confirmation hearing, all of which deal with one incident on 
February 24, 2003, in Bogoro, Ituri.84 At the Special Court of 
                                                 
81 Louis Moreno-Ocampo, Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, Office of the 




83 See Prosecutor v.Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 410 (Jan. 29, 2007). M. Lubanga is 
charged as a co-perpetrator, with war crimes consisting of: (i) Enlisting and 
conscripting of children under the age of 15 years into the Forces patriotiques 
pour la libération du Congo [Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo] 
(FPLC) and using them to participate actively in hostilities in the context of an 
international armed conflict from early September 2002 to June 2, 2003 
(punishable under article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Rome Statute); and (ii) Enlisting 
and conscripting children under the age of 15 years into the FPLC and using 
them to participate actively in hostilities in the context of an armed conflict not 
of an international character from June 2, 2003 to August 13, 2003 (punishable 
under article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute). 
84 See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-01/07, Situation in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 573-581 (Sept. 30, 2008). On September 26, 
2008, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I confirmed all but three of the charges against 
the two defendants. The Chamber found insufficient evidence to try the accused 
for inhuman treatment and outrages upon personal dignity (war crimes). The 
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Sierra Leone, Rule 73bis extended powers were adopted in 2006.85 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has yet to 
implement the full range.86 Before the Extraordinary Chambers of 
the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), the Co-Investigating Judges have 
extensive powers to ensure a thorough investigation of both 
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence,87 before formulating the 
indictment in order to ensure that it does not contain charges, crime 
sites or incidents which are irrelevant, unnecessary or where there 
is insufficient evidence.88 After the indictment has been issued, the 
trial chamber retains the power to reject an application to call a 
particular witness if it considers that it would not be conducive to 
the good administration of justice.89 In consultation with other 
judges, the President may also exclude any proceedings that 
unnecessarily delay the trial and are not conducive to ascertaining 
the truth.90 
¶39 Whether the appropriate mechanism involves the adoption of 
extended Rule 73bis powers or other methods of control such as 
the confirmation hearing process at the ICC or the pre-trial 
investigation procedure before the ECCC, the proactive 
implementation and application of such measures is essential to 
ensure the expediency of future international criminal proceedings. 
                                                                                                             
Chamber also declined the charge of inhumane acts (a crime against humanity).  
85 Special Court for Sierra Leone, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 
73bis(G) (Jan. 16, 2002) (adopted on Nov. 24, 2006, the subsection states: “In 
the interest of a fair and expeditious trial, the Trial Chamber, after hearing the 
parties, may at any time invite the Prosecutor to reduce the number of counts 
charged in the Indictment. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber may determine a 
number of sites or incidents comprised in one or more of the charges made by 
the Prosecutor, which may reasonably be held to be representative of the crimes 
charged.”),http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=1YNrqhd4L5s%3d&t
abid=200. 
86 At the time of publication, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence at the ICTR 
did not include the equivalent of Rule 73bis(D) and (E) powers before the ICTY.  
87 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Internal Rules, Rule 
55(5) (Sept. 5, 2008), 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/fileUpload/88/IR_Revision2_05-01-
08_En.pdf.  
88 Id. at Rule 66(2), 67. 
89 Id. at Rule 80(2). 
90 Id. at Rule 85(1). 
